Washington Law Review
Volume 74

Number 2

4-1-1999

Washington's "Spam-Killing" Statute: Does It Slaughter Privacy in
the Process?
Steven Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Computer Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven Miller, Notes and Comments, Washington's "Spam-Killing" Statute: Does It Slaughter Privacy in the
Process?, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 453 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol74/iss2/8

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright 0 1999 by Washington Law Review Association

WASHINGTON'S "SPAM-K[LLING" STATUTE: DOES IT
SLAUGHTER PRIVACY IN THE PROCESS?
Steven Miller
Abstract: In 1998, the Washington Legislature passed an historic law prohibiting the
sending of commercial e-mail messages containing false or misleading information in the
subject line or header. The law also permits companies that provide Internet services, known
as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), to block the transmission or receipt of messages
reasonably believed to violate the statute. However, the law fails to specify the permissible
activities that an ISP may pursue to form such a reasonable belief. It thereby encourages a
variety of intrusive ISP activities, such as message screening. Existing statutory and
constitutional privacy law provides the only shield for an e-mail subscriber against invasive
to provide
ISP activities. This Comment argues that these existing privacy laws fail
meaningful protection to e-mail subscribers from the potential abuses of their ISPs. The
Comment recommends legislative action to amend the anti-spain law by explicitly limiting
the ways in which an ISP may develop its "reasonable belief" that a particular e-mail
message violates the anti-spare statute.

Samantha begins typing an electronic mail, or e-mail, to her business
partner, Roger, outlining her latest ideas about their plan to found an
Internet start up company that would offer innovative new services over
the World Wide Web. She titles the message "A few more thoughts
about our new company." At the end of the message, Samantha quickly
reminds Roger that she is in the market for a new computer and that she
would gladly sell her old computer to him for a decent price. Samantha
clicks the "send" button on her e-mail browser and assumes that Roger
will receive the message without delay or inspection.
The message travels across the Internet to Roger's Internet Service
Provider (ISP),1 but unknown to Samantha or Roger, the ISP saves a
copy of the message for delivery. The ISP then examines the contents of
the saved message, including Samantha's private statements about their
new Internet company. Based on Samantha's comment about selling her
computer, the ISP determines that the message constitutes commercial email containing a false or misleading subject line. The ISP then directs
the message into cyberspace limbo.

1. An ISP is a company or organization that provides its subscribers with access to the Internet.
Typically, the ISP also furnishes each subscriber with a private e-mail account, although this is not
always the case. See Learn the Net, LEARN THE NET: How E-mail Works (last modified Mar. 22,
1999) <http://www.learnthenet.com/english/html/20how.htm>. This Comment treats ISPs and e-mail
service providers identically.
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Samantha reasonably assumes that Roger received the message.
Roger, on the other hand, wonders why Samantha has taken so long to
respond to his last e-mail. Meanwhile, Roger's ISP is apprised of
Samantha and Roger's innovative ideas for an Internet startup company.
Nevertheless, Samantha and Roger may be statutorily precluded from
seeking legal relief against the ISP for injuries stemming from the ISP's
monitoring and blocking activities.
In 1998, the Washington Legislature enacted a statute that purports to
increase the privacy of the e-mail inbox by protecting it from false or
misleading commercial e-mail messages, but actually diminished users'
privacy in the messages they send and receive. The statute,2 commonly
known as the Washington "anti-spam" law,3 attempts to curb unwanted
e-mail by prohibiting the initiation of commercial e-mail that either
misrepresents the origin of the message or contains misleading
information in the subject line. The statute also permits those injured by
such e-mail to initiate civil suits against the sender. These provisions
provide privacy protection for e-mail consumers against unwanted
fraudulent e-mail.
The statute also permits ISPs to block the transmission or receipt of
messages they reasonably believe violate the statute. Because the statute
requires that an ISP must reasonably believe that an e-mail message
violates the statute before blocking the e-mail, the statute implicitly
encourages ISPs to examine the contents of messages to form that
reasonable belief. The statute also relieves ISPs from liability for
blocking the transmission or receipt of such messages when ISPs do so in
good faith.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the existing anti-spam
law. Part II summarizes statutory and constitutional privacy rights that
are relevant to e-mail subscriber privacy. Part III describes three possible
courses of action that an ISP might take to enforce its statutory right to
block violative messages. Part IV argues that the existing statutory and
constitutional privacy rights provide e-mail subscribers with inadequate
protection from highly intrusive ISP courses of action. Part V

2. 1998 Wash. Laws 149 (codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.005 (1998)).
3. The word "spare" is a derisive label for unwanted commercial e-mail messages. Indeed, the
word has such negative connotations that the Hormel Foods Company, manufacturer of a processed
meat product with the same name, sued to enjoin the use of the word on a commercial web site.
Hormel's efforts in court were unsuccessful. Laurie J. Flynn, Gracious Concession on Internet
'Spam,'N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,1998, at D3.

E-mail Privacy Statute

recommends amendment of the Washington anti-spain law to prohibit
ISPs from actively monitoring the content of messages. It further
recommends permitting ISPs to block messages only in response to past
subscriber complaints. This approach will improve the protection of

subscribers from the intrusive actions of ISPs without substantially
diluting the protection that the legislature intended to provide ISPs.

I.

WASHINGTON'S ANTI-SPAM STATUTE

A.

The Impetus for a Statutory Solution

E-mail is quickly becoming a profoundly important tool of
communication. One analyst estimates that there are nearly 200 million
active e-mail accounts worldwide Two factors contributing to the

astonishing growth of e-mail communication are its blindingly fast speed
and extremely low cost.' However, not unlike the traditional mailbox,
advertisements

have

increasingly

saturated

the

e-mail

inbox.6

Technologically savvy entrepreneurs, alert to the potential for profit from
the technology and the captive audience of e-mail subscribers, have
responded by sending large quantities of commercial electronic messages
to those subscribers.7
Commercial bulk e-mailing has frustrated e-mail subscribers. The
practice has also substantially burdened the companies that provide
Internet access, ISPs. The Internet depends on the cooperative efforts of
computer network operators who "independently decided to use common
data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information
with other computers (which in turn exchange communications and
information with still other computers)." 8 Once a user sends an e-mail
4. Deborah Branscum, King of'Spam'andProudoflt,Newsweek, May 12, 1997, at 90, 90.
5. Most e-mail subscribers pay either a flat fee for unlimited access or a per-hour rate for Internet
access. Subscribers typically do not pay any per-message costs, and therefore, the marginal cost of
sending e-mail messages is low. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997). Many users also have access to e-mail through their employment or school
and do not personally pay for those e-mail services.
6. One entrepreneur allegedly sent between 100,000 and 1,000,000 unsolicited e-mail messages
per week advertising a book about making money on the Intemet. Peter Lewis, State Targets Oregon
Man in FirstAnti-Spare Lawsuit, Seattle Times, Oct. 22, 1998, at Al.
7. The only major cost that senders of bulk e-mail incur is the cost of obtaining lists of e-mail
addresses to which they can send their messages. For a one-time start-up cost of about $1000,
senders can purchase software that will harvest those e-mail addresses. Branscum, supra note 4,
at 90.
8. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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message over the Internet, computers relay the message from one
Internet server to another until the message arrives at its intended
destination. Thus, ISPs with no relationship to the sending or receiving
parties act as postal carriers for these messages, and the computers of
those ISPs shoulder the burden of forwarding the messages to their
intended recipients. 9 Although foreign ISPs receive no reimbursement
from the senders of bulk e-mail messages, they are nevertheless co-opted
into service and exposed to potential computer overload from the highly
concentrated volume of e-mail communication. Bulk e-mailers may also
deliberately impose costs on foreign ISPs by falsifying the point of origin
of their bulk e-mail messages.' 0 Likewise, receiving ISPs incur
substantial costs when the unwanted bulk e-mail messages arrive at their
intended destinations, because the receiving ISPs must process and store
the messages for delivery to the intended recipients."
B.

The Provisionsof Washington 's "Anti-Spam " Law

In March 1998, lawmakers in Washington unanimously voted to take
action against abusive commercial e-mail practices when they enacted
Washington's "anti-spam" law.'" The law prohibits the initiation of
commercial e-mail messages that misrepresent the source of the
message 3 or contain false or misleading information in the subject line.' 4
9. This Comment uses the term "foreign ISP" to describe ISPs having no contractual relationship
with either the sender or the recipient of an e-mail message.
10. For instance, a bulk e-mail sender may send a message that falsely purports to originate from
an account with America Online, a national ISP. Because recipients of the message reasonably
assume that the message originated with America Online, those recipients may send responses or
complaints to America Online, which involuntarily assumes the cost of processing, storing, and
responding to the complaints. America Online also receives any messages that are returned as
undeliverable and bears the costs of processing those messages as well. America Online, Inc. v. IMS,
24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (E.D. Va. 1998).
11. See, for example, Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 438
(E.D. Pa. 1996), in which America Online, a major ISP, complained that its e-mail servers were
being overloaded by millions of e-mail messages that Cyber Promotions, a sender of unsolicited
spam e-mail, was sending to America Online subscribers each day. America Online has estimated
that it receives at least one million spain e-mail messages per day from various senders. William
Baldwin, Spam Killers, Forbes, Sept. 21, 1998, at 254,254.
12. The Act passed the Washington Senate with 42 yeas, zero nays and then passed the State
House of Representatives with 96 yeas, zero nays. Certification of Enrollment, E.S.H.B. 2752, 55th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998). The Act is codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.005-.050 (1998).
13. The statute prohibits parties from sending commercial e-mails purporting to originate from
"nobody@nowhere.com" when the e-mail actually originates from another e-mail account. See infra
note 22 and accompanying text.

E-mail Privacy Statute
and
The legislature found that the growing volume of commercial e-mail
5
relief.'
immediate
warranted
ISPs
on
burden
the accompanying

The law originally proposed to combat spain would have directly
prohibited unsolicited commercial e-mail messages, 6 but the version the
legislature ultimately adopted indirectly regulates unsolicited e-mail by
prohibiting commercial messages with false or misleading information.'
The initial proposal faced a vigorous challenge from the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) because the proposal contained an "exceedingly
broad definition of unsolicited commercial speech."' 8 These protests
from free speech supporters convinced the Washington Legislature to

indirectly regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail by prohibiting false or
misleading commercial e-mail. 9 The legislature apparently believed that

regulating false or misleading commercial e-mail was more consistent
than completely
with the First Amendment of the U.S. 2Constitution
0
prohibiting unsolicited commercial e-mail.
The statute sets forth two distinct ways in which an e-mail message
can violate the law.2' First, the statute prohibits messages containing
misleading point of origin information.' Thus, a message indicating that
"nobody@nowhere.com" is the originating party of the e-mail violates
the statute if the message originated from a different sender. Second, a

14. If the subject line claims "You've just won $1000!" but the content of the message instead
promotes a "get rich quick" scheme, that message would violate the statute. See infra notes 23-24
and accompanying text.
15. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.005.
16. S.H.B. 2752, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998). This was also the approach originally
endorsed by the Attorney General. Attorney Gen. of Wash., 1998 Legislative Agenda (visited Mar.
12, 1999) <http://www.wa.gov/ago/testldocket/storyvault! 98_leg_ agenda.html>.
17. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.005-.050. A commercial e-mail message is one that is "sent
for the purpose of promoting real property, goods, or services for sale or lease." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 19.190.010(1).
18. Peter Lewis, Sparm on Trial, Seattle Times, June 7, 1998, at C1 (quoting ACLU's Jerry
Sheehan).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) ("[T]he government
may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.").
21. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1).
22. The precise language of the statute prohibits the sending of any e-mail that "[ulses a third
party's internet domain name without permission of the third party, or otherwise misrepresents any
information in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic
mail message." Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1)(a). Because using a third party's Internet domain
name without permission is likely to misrepresent the point of origin, this Comment uses the phrase
"misleading point of origin" to refer to both practices.
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message also violates the statute if it contains false or misleading
information in the subject line. 3 For example, if the subject line reads
"You've just won $1000!" but the content of the message instead
promotes a "get rich quick" scheme, the e-mail violates the statute.24
Contrary to the original proposal, a message does not violate the statute
merely because it is unsolicited commercial e-mail, nor is "solicited"
e-mail necessarily immune from attack under the statute.25
Because the statute is state legislation, its scope is geographically
limited.26 Thus, messages with false or misleading information violate
the statute only if they are sent from a computer located in Washington
or to an e-mail account that the sender knows is held by a Washington
resident.27 For purposes of the statute, the sender of an e-mail message
knows that the receiving party is a Washington resident if "that
information is available, upon request, from the registrant of the internet
domain name contained in the recipient's electronic mail address."28
The intended recipient and the receiving ISP may bring a civil action
against violators to recover their damages, although the measure of their

23. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(l)(b).
24. A subject line contains false or misleading information if the subject line misrepresents the
text contained in the body of the e-mail message. See Attorney Gen. of Wash., Unsolicited E-mail
(visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.wa.gov/ago/junkemail/verify.html>.
25. The Code titles for the sections that set forth the prohibitions on commercial e-mail messages
both begin with the phrase "Unsolicited or misleading electronic mail." Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 19.190.020 & .030 (1998). The Attorney General's web site also indicates that an ISP may block
e-mail only once the ISP has reason to believe that its network is being used "to send unlawful
unsolicitedcommercial e-mail." Attorney Gen. of Wash., UnsolicitedE-mail (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
<http://www.wa.gov/ago/junkemaiVprotect.html> (emphasis added). Although the original legislative
proposal did define unsolicited e-mail as a violation, the prohibitions enacted by the legislature
contain no language regarding unsolicited mail in either the titles or the text. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text. Because there is a discrepancy between the Code version and the enacted
version, the actual language of the legislative enactment trumps the codified version. State v. City of
Mercer Island, 58 Wash. 2d 141, 144, 361 P.2d 369, 371 (1961) (holding that text of legislative
enactment prevails over restatement thereof in Code).
26. A question exists as to whether the present statute impermissibly interferes with interstate
commerce, in violation of the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Lewis, supra note 18, at
C1. Careful consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
27. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1) (1998).
28. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(2) (1998). The Attorney General and the Washington Association of Internet Service Providers (WAISP) co-sponsor a statewide registry of e-mail accounts
held by Washington residents. Washington e-mail subscribers can register their accounts by
accessing the WAISP Registry Page. Washington Ass'n of Internet Serv. Providers, WAISP Registry
Page(last modified Sept. 21, 1998) <http://registry.waisp.org>.

E-mail Privacy Statute
damages may differ.29 The statute also declares that violations of the anti-

sparn law qualify as violations of the Consumer Protection Act.30 As a
result, the Attorney General may sue violators of the anti-spam law.3' In
addition, because an anti-sparn statute violation is also a Consumer
Protection Act violation," recipients and ISPs may seek to recover

attorneys' fees in their own actions for damages.33
Perhaps the most controversial portion of the law is the provision
allowing ISPs to block voluntarily the transmission or delivery of e-mail
that the ISP reasonably believes violates the statute.34 The anti-spain

statute relieves ISPs from liability if they block e-mail in good faith
reliance on the statute.35 The statutory text does not, however, limit or
define the ways in which an ISP may form the requisite reasonable
belief. This gap in the statute exposes e-mail subscribers to numerous
potential privacy invasions by their ISPs.
II.

EXISTING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS RELEVANT TO
E-MAIL MESSAGES

Federal and state laws presently provide some communications
privacy protection. The Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act

protects electronic communications from unauthorized interception,
access, and disclosure.36 The Washington Constitution protects the
privacy right in decisionmaking and in nondisclosure of personal

29. Damages for e-mail subscribers are presumptively set at $500 per e-mail, but subscribers may
recover actual damages if they are greater than the presumed amount. ISPs are presumed to suffer
$1000 per violative e-mail, but may recover actual damages if they exceed the presumed amount.
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.040 (1998).
30. A violation of the anti-spam law is "an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an
unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, chapter
19.86." Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.030(2) (1998).
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.080 (1998). The Washington Attorney General first exercised this
power in October 1998 by filing an action against an Oregon man who allegedly sent violative
commercial e-mail messages. Lewis, supra note 6, at Al.
32. See supranote 30.
33. Parties injured by unfair methods of competition or by unfair or deceptive acts of trade may
seek reasonable attorney's fees. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 (1998); see also Attorney Gen. of
Wash., Unsolicited E-mail (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http:lwww.wa.gov/ago/junkemaillacion.html>
(indicating that recipients of violative e-mail messages may be eligible to recover attorney's fees).
34. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.050(1) (1998).
35. Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.050(2) (1998).
36. See infra Part U.A.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:453, 1999

information." The Washington Privacy Act, which predates the antispain law, prohibits unauthorized parties from opening or reading sealed
messages and also forbids the use of a device to record or intercept pointto-point communications. 8
A.

The FederalElectronic CommunicationsPrivacyAct

In 1986, Congress amended the Federal Wiretap Act by passing the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 39 The ECPA prohibits
unauthorized interception of electronic communications during their
transmission,4" disallows unauthorized access to or interference with
electronic communications while they are in storage,4 and forbids
electronic communication service providers from divulging the contents
of stored electronic communications.42 Violators are subject to civil suit
for damages,4 3 and under certain circumstances may be subject to fines,
imprisonment, or both.'
Although the ECPA does not expressly mention e-mail,45 the statutory
language does protect "electronic communication." 4 6 Several courts have
concluded that the statutory protection encompasses e-mail messages.47
The legislative history of the statute also strongly indicates that the
legislature anticipated that the ECPA protections against interception,
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part ll.C.
39. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994)).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
43. The statute authorizes actions for civil damages for interception of electronic messages
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2520 (1994), and for unauthorized access or distribution of such messages
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2707 (1994).
44. Fine and/or imprisonment may serve as the penalties for unauthorized interception or access.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4), 2701(b) (1994).
45. Jennifer C. Dombrow, Note, Electronic Communications and the Law: Help or Hindranceto
Telecommuting?, 50 Fed. Comm. L.J. 685, 696 (1998).
46. Electronic communication is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
47. See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Wesley
College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp 375, 381 (D. Del. 1997); State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Fin.
Servs., Inc., 909 F. Supp 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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access, and disclosure would protect e-mail messages.48 Because the

ECPA's provisions regarding interception, access, and disclosure are
subject to varying rules and exceptions,49 the following discussion treats
each provision separately.
1.

Interception ofElectronic CommunicationsDuring Transmission

The ECPA prohibits interception, which is defined as the "acquisition
of the contents of any... electronic ... communication through the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."5' This prohibition on
interception applies to electronic communication only at the time of

transmission and does not apply once messages have been stored for later
retrieval.51 Furthermore, this provision only prevents acquisition of the

contents of the messages.52 The provision does not protect other
information contained in an electronic communication, such as the
identity of the sending party of an e-mail message.53
Acquisition of the contents of an electronic communication that would
otherwise constitute an "interception" might nonetheless fall under one
of the statutorily enumerated exceptions. The ECPA permits interception
of an electronic communication when one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception.' In
addition, electronic communication service providers are permitted to
intercept or use electronic communications in a manner that is necessary to
provide service or to protect the rights or property of the service provider.5
48. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 8 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568 (recognizing
that ECPA does not explicitly address e-mail messages, but that scope of statute encompasses
electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and video teleconferences).
49. See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (distinguishing
between protection from interception during transmission under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and protection of
stored communications under §§2701-11); State Wide, 909 F. Supp. at 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(distinguishing between access to stored electronic communications and disclosure of stored
communications).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994).
51. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
52. The ECPA defines "contents" with respect to electronic communication as "includ[ing] any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8) (1994).
53. Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(interpreting ECPA's definition of "contents" as not extending to identity of sending party of e-mail
message).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)()-(d) (1994).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(i) (1994).
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Disclosureof Stored Electronic Communications

A second provision of the ECPA specifically addresses electronic
communications service providers and prohibits those providers from
disclosing the contents of electronic communications in storage. 6 Under
the statute, providers of electronic communications services may not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a stored
communication. 7 While this provision prohibits disclosure of the
contents of a message, it does not prohibit disclosure of information
unrelated to the substance of the message. 8 Thus, an Internet service
provider may divulge the identity of the author of an e-mail without
violating the statute because the identity of the author does not qualify as
content under the ECPA. 9
The disclosure provision also contains exceptions. A service provider
may disclose the contents of a message to the intended recipient of the
communication or to others with the lawful consent of the originator or
intended recipient.6' The exceptions also permit disclosure to employees
of a communications service provider whose facilities forward the
communication to its destination.6" In addition, a communication service
provider may disclose the contents of a message when such disclosure is
"necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of
the rights or property of the provider of that service."'
3.

Access to Stored Electronic Communications

Finally, the ECPA forbids unauthorized access to stored electronic
communications.' A violation occurs under this provision when, without
permission, a person "obtains, alters or prevents authorized access to

56. The ECPA defines "electronic storage" as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and... any storage of
such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)-(B) (1994).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (1994).
58. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
59. Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (1994).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (1994).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(4) (1994).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (1994).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994). For the ECPA definition of electronic storage, see supra note 56.

462
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5
a[n] .. electronic communication while it is in electronic storage."
However, the statute permits the person or company providing the electronic
communication service to access stored electronic communications.'
Indeed, this exception "allows service providers to do as they wish when it
comes to accessing communications in electronic storage." 7

B.

ConstitutionalPrivacyProtectionsin Washington

The Washington Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."6"
The traditional approach to claims of constitutional privacy infringement,
however, has been to focus primarily on the federal constitutional right
of privacy,69 which is triggered only by state action.7"
Washington courts recognize two rights of privacy: the right to
autonomous decisionmaking and the right to nondisclosure of personal
information. Consistent with U.S. Supreme Court cases, Washington
courts have recognized the right to autonomous decisionmaking as a
"fundamental right."' The Supreme Court of Washington has strictly
scrutinized government action that infringes upon the right to
autonomous decisionmaking.72 Under strict scrutiny analysis, the
government must demonstrate some compelling governmental reason for
infringing upon the fundamental right.7 3 Nondisclosure of private
information, however, is not treated as a fundamental right.74 Because the
right of nondisclosure is not fundamental, the court has applied a more

65. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1994).
67. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D.Nev. 1996) (finding no violation of
ECPA's prohibition against access to stored messages when city officials retrieved archived
messages sent by city police officers over alphanumeric paging system because city was service
provider under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)).
68. Wash. Const. art. , § 7.

69. See, e.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) (deciding whether

terminally ill adults have privacy right to refuse life support under Federal Constitution, but
recognizing that Washington Constitution provides support for court's decision).

70. Id.
71. See, e.g., O'Hartigan v. Department of Personnel, 118 Wash. 2d 111, 117, 821 P.2d 44,47-

48 (1991).
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:453, 1999

deferential "rational basis" analysis to the governmental activity." Under
the rational basis test, state action is permissible if the state articulates a
legitimate governmental interest that the state action is designed to
achieve.76 The constitutional touchstone of the rational basis inquiry is
not whether the state engaged in the least intrusive means possible, but
whether the state engaged in activities appropriately tailored to further a
legitimate state interest."
Although the Washington Constitution protects against inappropriate
state intrusion regarding decisionmaking and nondisclosure, some forms
of private action might constitute "state action" under even the U.S.
Constitution. For example, in the context of racial discrimination cases,
federal courts may treat private conduct as state action if a claimed
constitutional deprivation resulted from the actor's exercise of a state
authorized right or privilege and if the court could fairly describe the
acting party as a state actor.78 The Court has relied on three factors in
determining whether an actor qualifies as a state actor: the degree of
reliance that the private actor has on governmental assistance and benefits, whether the private actor is providing a traditional governmental
function, and whether the incidents of governmental authority uniquely
aggravated the injuries suffered.7 9 Although this analysis was designed to
confront the question of state action in race discrimination cases, the
analysis could apply in other contexts where state action is at issue.8"
Some question exists as to whether state action is required to implicate
the privacy right guaranteed by the Washington Constitution. The federal
constitutional privacy right is not triggered unless "state action" occurs.8"
75. Id.
76. Id. at 118,821 P.2d at48.
77. Id. at 118-20, 821 P.2d at 48-50 (upholding use of statutorily authorized polygraph testing to
screen potential law enforcement employees despite availability of less intrusive means to obtain
similar background information).
78. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
79. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-28 (1991) (finding state action for
equal protection purposes when private litigants in civil suit exercised peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors based on race).
80. G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility [Part! offfl, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 665, 733 (1997).
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (indicating that fundamental rights of privacy are
founded "in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action"). Washington's interpretation of the right to privacy guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution has more explicitly indicated the need for triggering state
action. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983).
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However, Washington's constitutional privacy provision is not expressly
limited to government conduct, 2 and the Supreme Court of Washington
has refused to decide whether the state constitutional language protects
against private action.83 Moreover, the court has held that the speech and
initiative clauses of the Washington Constitution, which are also phrased
as rights of the people and not prohibitions against government, forbid
even private action that intrudes on those rights.' Nevertheless, the
court's interpretation of the speech and initiative clauses was based, in
part, on the preferred status of the speech and initiative rights."5 As a
result, it remains unknown whether state action is required to trigger the
privacy protection of the Washington Constitution, especially when nonpreferred privacy rights are at issue.86
C.

The Washington PrivacyAct

Since 1909, the Washington Privacy Act has protected sealed
messages, letters, and telegrams from being opened or read by someone
other than the intended recipient. 7 More recently, the legislature
expanded the protection to prohibit interception or recording of private
conversations or communications transmitted by telephone, radio, or
other point-to-point communications device. 8 This expansion created
one of the most restrictive privacy acts in the nation. 9 Violations of any
of these privacy protections may subject the violator to civil suit for
damages, reasonable attorney's fees,9" and even criminal charges.91

82. See supra note 68.
83. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 783, 819 P.2d 370,376 (1991) (indicating
that whether wholly private conduct can violate state constitutional privacy right remains open
question in Washington).
84. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243, 635 P.2d 108,
115-16 (1981).
85. Id at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116.
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.73.010-.020 (1998).
88. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030 (1998).
89. State v. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d 476,481,910 P.2d 447,449 (1996).
90. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.060 (1998).
91. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.73.010-.030, .080 (1998).
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Protection of Sealed Messages

Washington law prohibits the willful opening or reading of sealed
messages, letters, and telegrams by persons other than the intended
recipient.92 This simply worded prohibition does not define some of its
essential terms, such as "sealed" or "messages." However, in interpreting
other undefined terms of the Privacy Act, the Supreme Court of
Washington has consistently examined the ordinary meanings of
undefined words.93
2.

ProtectionAgainst Use of a Device to Intercept or Record

The Privacy Act also prohibits the use of a device to record or
intercept private communications transmitted by telephone, telegraph,
radio, or other point-to-point communications device.94 Communications
gain protection only if they can be classified as "private,"95 which is
determined by the intent and reasonable expectations of the parties to the
communication.96 The mere fact that a communication medium is not
completely secure does not render conversations on that medium nonprivate.97 Instead, the reasonableness standard requires a case-by-case
inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and focuses primarily on the
reasonable expectations of the parties involved.9" Under such a
reasonableness standard, a military tribunal found that an e-mail
subscriber had a reasonable expectation of privacy in messages sent to
other e-mail users with personally assigned passwords.99

92. "Every person who shall wilfully open or read, or cause to be opened or read, any sealed
message, letter or telegram intended for another person... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Wash.
Rev. Code § 9.73.020.
93. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d at 484, 910 P.2d at 451 (looking to English language dictionary when
interpreting meaning of "privacy").
94. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(a).
95. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d at 484, 9 10 P.2d at 451.
96. Id.
97. The mere use of a cordless telephone did not undermine the clear intent of the parties to keep
their telephone conversation private, despite the substantial potential for interception of the
conversation. Id.at 485, 910 P.2d at 451.
98. Id. at484-85,910P.2dat451.
99. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Not all subjective expectations of privacy will meet the
reasonableness test, however. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington held as a matter of
law that answers given in response to questions asked by an unknown person over the telephone
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No recording or interception takes place without the use of a recording
or transmission device external to the communication.'00 For instance, no
interception or recording occurs when a police informant tilts a telephone
receiver so that a police officer can hear the conversation because the
officer is merely listening to the sounds emanating from the original
communication device.' Similarly, there is no interception or recording
when one police officer listens on an extension line to a telephone
conversation placed to another police officer, as there is no use of a
recording or transmitting device separate from the telephone system used
in the communication itself.0"
III. FORMING THE REQUIRED REASONABLE BELIEF
The Washington anti-sparn statute requires an ISP to have a
reasonable belief that a message violates the statute before an ISP may
block the message. °3 The statute, however, neither indicates what actions
an ISP is entitled to take to form the requisite reasonable belief, nor
limits those actions. The statute's silence on this point creates the
possibility that different ISPs may rely on a variety of methods of
obtaining reasonable belief. These various methods have different
impacts on the e-mail subscriber's privacy.
A.

Basic Components of E-mailMessages

The various methods of screening e-mail messages treat the
component parts of the message differently, according to their function
and content. Thus, to understand screening methods, one must first
comprehend the components of an e-mail message. An e-mail message
has three basic components: the header, the body, and the subject line.
The header of an e-mail message contains point-of-origin information."° Like the information contained on the outside of an envelope
in which a letter is sealed, the header typically contains the name and
were not private. Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash. 2d 178, 190-91, 829 P.2d
1061, 1067-68 (1992).
100. State v. Corliss, 123 Wash. 2d 656,662, 870 P.2d 317,320 (1994).
101. Id
102. State v. Bonilla, 23 Wash. App. 869, 873, 598 P.2d 783, 786 (1979).
103. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
104. Learn the Net, LEARN THE NET. Anatomy of an E-mail Message (last modified Mar. 22,
1999) <www.learnthenet.conienglish/html/21e.anat.htm>.
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electronic return address of the sender as well as the e-mail address of
the intended recipient.'
During delivery, the header accumulates
electronic postmarks indicating the path that the letter has taken to reach
its destination." 6
The body of an e-mail message contains the message text.'0 7 In this
regard, the body is roughly comparable to the contents of a regular letter.
The body of the message is typically pure "content" and will rarely be
useful to an ISP during delivery. It is conceivable, however, that an ISP
might have a legitimate need to examine the content of an e-mail to
08
determine where to route misdelivered e-mail.'
The subject line of an e-mail message contains text that briefly
describes the body of the e-mail." 9 The subject line is similar to the
"RE:" line of a memorandum and may be thought of as the title of the
e-mail. Many e-mail browsers automatically display the subject line of
an e-mail in the inbox, even before the user "opens" the message. In that
sense, the information contained in the subject line seems more visible
and open to view, and is therefore similar to the header information. The
subject line usually contains a summary of the body "content,"" making
it similar to the body of an e-mail message.
B.

Three ISP Approaches to FormingReasonableBelief

An ISP seeking to form a reasonable belief under the anti-spam statute
may treat the various components of e-mail messages differently, based
on differences in the content and function of those components. Consider
the following three approaches a receiving ISP might take to form the
required reasonable belief."'
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Ian C. Ballon, Linking, Framingand OtherHot Topics in Internet Law and Litigation, 520
PLI/Pat. 167,295 (1998).
109. Technically, the subject line may be considered part of the header of an e-mail message.
Learn the Net, supra note 104. However, because the subject line contains content, this Comment
treats the two concepts as distinct.
110. The subject line contains "content," at least as the ECPA defines that term. See supranote 52
and accompanying text. While the ECPA definition is not directly applicable in the context of the
Privacy Act, the ECPA does seem to provide some assistance in determining the type of protection
the subject line should receive.
111. The following approaches focus on the potential activities of a receiving ISP. See, e.g.,
infra note 113. However, sending and foreign ISPs might also rely on variations of the three
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First, a receiving ISP might choose to rely solely on the prior
experiences of its customers. The Washington Attorney General

interprets the anti-spare statute as allowing ISPs to form the requisite
reasonable belief by relying on past subscriber complaints about a
sending party."' For instance, if a receiving ISP learns that its customers
received messages from "nobody@nowhere.com" in violation of the

statute, the receiving ISP may refuse to deliver any future message from
that address or domain name. Under such an approach, the ISP could rely
solely on subscriber complaints to determine whether commercial e-mail
violations have occurred and could develop a blacklist of offenders

whose e-mail would be subject to automatic blocking."' This approach
only requires an examination of e-mail header information to see if the
sending party is a known offender and requires no examination of the

subject line or body of any given message."'
Second, an ISP might choose to develop affirmatively its reasonable

belief by relying on active content monitoring. Under this "proactive
approach," the ISP actively verifies point of origin information and
confirms the accuracy of subject lines. The ISP would verify the
consistency of the identifying information in the header to determine the
accuracy of point of origin information." 5 The ISP would then examine
the content of the message to determine whether it qualifies as
commercial mail. To verify the accuracy of the subject line, the receiving
ISP would rely on either sophisticated software or the watchful eye of an

described approaches in trying to enforce the statute. In one case, a sending ISP discontinued service
to its own e-mail subscriber because of costs that the subscriber's bulk e-mailing imposed on the
ISP. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Info. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-5931, 1997 WL
634384, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997) (issuing preliminary injunction requiring ISP to continue
providing service to bulk e-mailer).
112. "Once an ISP has reason to believe their [sic] network is being used to send unlawful
unsolicited commercial e-mail, they [sic] can block all further e-mail sent to its subscribers from the
address or domain name of the subscriber." Attorney Gen. of Wash., supranote 25.
113. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (refusing to prohibit national ISP's use of software programs to filter out messages of
particular commercial e-mail sender when filtering began only after substantial customer
complaints).
114. This approach assumes that an ISP can reasonably believe that all future e-mail messages
from a blacklisted sender will contain false or misleading information and will be commercial in nature.
The Attorney General of Washington apparently endorses this assumption. See supra note 112.
115. For instance, software could check to ensure that the sender's address, the return address,
and the sending ISP's domain name are consistent.
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ISP employee to compare the subject lines to the bodies of incoming
e-mail messages." 6
A third approach might combine aspects of the proactive and
reactionary approaches. This "hybrid approach" would actively monitor
point of origin information for violations, but would not actively monitor
the subject line of messages, out of respect for the user's privacy.
Instead, the ISP would reactively rely on subscriber complaints as the
source of its reasonable belief that a particular message violates the
subject line prong of the anti-sparn law. This portion of hybrid
monitoring is consistent with the reactionary approach and, like that
approach, would rely solely on past subscriber complaints. The other
portion of hybrid monitoring engages in active monitoring of point of
origin information contained within the header. The ISP also must form a
reasonable belief that a given message is "commercial," '".7 because active
enforcement of the point of origin prong of the statute requires no prior
history with the sending party. Thus, ISPs relying on the hybrid approach
must actively scan some content-laden portion of e-mail messages that
contain misleading point of origin information to develop a reasonable
belief that those messages are commercial in nature."'
IV. EXISTING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT
A.

Numerous Exceptions to ECPA ProvisionsRender the Statute
Ineffective in PreventingISPsfrom ScreeningE-mail Content

The federal ECPA's provisions regarding interception of, access to,
and disclosure of electronic communications provide little protection for
e-mail subscribers whose ISPs choose to inspect their e-mail messages
for violations of the Washington anti-spam law. The ECPA's prohibition
of interception affords the greatest potential privacy protection to e-mail
subscribers from ISP monitoring activities. However, ISPs can sequence
116. Although ISPs handle large volumes of e-mail, existing computer software can scan for
incoming e-mail messages of interest, based on the sender's address, keywords in the subject line or
body of the e-mail, or other information contained in the e-mail. If the software determines that a
message is suspicious, the software can save the message for later human examination. Jim Heath,
Survey: CorporateUses of Cryptography (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.iinet.net.au/-heath/
crypto.html>.
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. Perhaps ISPs could assess whether messages are commercial without examining the content
of the messages. However, it seems more likely that this assessment requires active investigation of
at least the subject line.
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their activities to completely avoid the interception provision. Although
the ECPA also prohibits disclosure and access, the exceptions to those
prohibitions render the ECPA completely ineffective against unwelcome
ISP content monitoring.
1.

ISPs CanAvoid ECPA 's InterceptionProvision by Carefully
Sequencing TheirActivities

The ECPA's prohibition against interception of electronic
communications can be completely sidestepped by careful ISP activity.
Reactionary monitoring fully conforms to ECPA's prohibition on
interception. Activities associated with the proactive and hybrid
approaches, on the other hand, qualify as interceptions. By sequencing
their activities, ISPs engaging in proactive and hybrid approaches can
circumvent the interception provision altogether." 9
An ISP can pursue a reactionary approach without running afoul of
the ECPA's protection against interception. Interception occurs when
there is nonconsensual acquisition of the substance of an electronic
communication not necessary for providing electronic communication
service. 2 ° When an ISP examines the header of an e-mail message
pursuant to a reactionary approach, the ISP is examining a portion of the
message that contains information identifying the sending and receiving
parties, and such information is not considered content under the
ECPA.12 1 Moreover, an ISP must have access to sender and recipient
information as a necessary incident to providing e-mail services. Thus,
the reactionary approach conforms to the requirements of the ECPA.
ISPs that engage in proactive or hybrid approaches may run afoul of
the ECPA's interception prohibition. Under this provision, ISPs may not
examine the contents of e-mail messages during transmission, which
terminates when a message has been stored for retrieval." Active and
hybrid approaches, by their nature, require ISPs to examine the subject
line and/or body of e-mail messages. This examination qualifies as an
acquisition of the substance of the e-mail communication," and such

119. Such sequencing is technologically feasible using existing software technology. See
supra note 116.
120. See supra notes 52, 54-55 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 51 and accompanying text
123. See supra note 110.
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acquisition is unnecessary to providing Internet service.'24 Thus,
proactive or hybrid ISP monitoring that occurs before a message is saved
for retrieval probably qualifies as interception under the ECPA.
ISPs that choose the active or hybrid approaches probably do not meet
the requirements of the protection of interests exception to the
interception provision. The ECPA permits interception by a
communications service provider when such interception is necessary to
protect the rights or property interests of the provider. 15 Active
monitoring protects the ISP's statutory right to block violative e-mail
messages. It also protects the ISP's property interests by relieving the
ISP from the burden of processing, storing, and transmitting false or
misleading e-mail messages, which are often sent in bulk quantities.' 26
While active monitoring may be useful in protecting ISP rights and
property interests, such monitoring is unnecessary because ISPs can
employ less intrusive approaches, like the reactionary approach, to
protect their rights. Because active monitoring is not necessary to protect
ISP rights or property, ISPs probably will be unsuccessful in arguing that
active monitoring meets the requirements of this exception.'27
ISPs can nevertheless avoid the interception inquiry entirely by first
saving incoming messages for retrieval and then examining the saved
version of the message to search for violations. This is because the
ECPA provision against interception applies only if the message has not
been stored for retrieval.'28 If the ISP has first saved the message for
retrieval, the ISP's subsequent access to the stored message is completely
unrestricted. 9 Thus, an ISP could circumvent this provision merely by
carefully sequencing its activities.
124. The Washington anti-spam law permits ISPs to voluntarily block violative e-mail messages
but does not require them to do so. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The mere fact that
inspection of the contents of incoming e-mail messages might be useful to the ISP in determining
whether to block e-mail should not transform it into a necessary incident to providing e-mail service.
Aside from enforcing the anti-spain law, an ISP will rarely, if ever, need to examine the contents of
an e-mail message to provide e-mail service to its subscribers. But see supra note 108 and
accompanying text (indicating that examining e-mail content may occasionally prove helpful in
e-mail delivery).
125. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
126. See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
127. This interpretation is consistent with the statute's express prohibition on continuous
monitoring of wire communications when such monitoring is not related to mechanical or service
quality control checks. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(i) (1994).
128. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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2.

Message ContentMay Be Revealed to ISP Employees Under an
Exception to ECPA DisclosureRules

The ECPA's prohibition against disclosure does not forestall any of
the three approaches to developing a reasonable belief because the ISP
activities envisioned by those approaches fall within the recognized
exceptions. The ECPA prohibits electronic communication providers
from disclosing the contents of a stored message to unauthorized parties,
except as is necessary to provide the service or to protect the provider's
rights and property interests. 3 ' Because the reactive approach requires no
examination of message content,' it does not violate the disclosure
provision. Conversely, the active and hybrid approaches envision
disclosure of message content to computer software and potentially to
ISP employees. Although the statute permits disclosure when necessary
to protect the rights of a service provider,' the rights of the ISP can be
adequately protected by other methods that do not require disclosure.
Another exception to this prohibition, however, specifically permits
disclosure to a person employed at a facility used to forward the
communication.' Because an e-mail provider employs the person who
ultimately examines the message content, the employee's examination of
the message would satisfy the exception. Thus, the active and hybrid
approaches under the anti-spain law do not violate the provisions
prohibiting ISPs from disclosing the contents of stored messages.
3.

ECPA PlacesNo Restrictionon ISP Access to StoredMessages

E-mail subscribers would have an even more difficult time advancing
claims against ISPs under the ECPA's prohibition of unauthorized access
to stored electronic communications. By examining the contents of a
stored e-mail message, an ISP accesses stored electronic communica"' However, the statute
tions. 34
creates a blanket exemption from the access
prohibition for the communications service provider, allowing ISPs to do

130. See supranotes 54-55 and accompanying text.
131. See supranotes 113-14 and accompanying text.
132. See supranote 63 and accompanying text.
133. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
134. By accessing and examining the e-mail, the ISP "obtains" the e-mail and by refusing to
deliver the message to its recipient, the ISP "prevents authorized access to" the e-mail. See supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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as they please when it comes to accessing stored communications. 35
Because of this blanket exemption, the statute does not restrict the
approaches that an ISP could use under the anti-spain statute.
B.

ISPs May ConstitutionallyMonitorE-mail Because They Are Not
State Actors and Their Actions Are Supported by a RationalBasis

Existing law recognizes that violations of Washington's constitutional
right to privacy occur when government action intrudes upon a person's
private affairs.136 The anti-spain statute only authorizes ISPs to
"voluntarily" block the transmission or receipt of messages reasonably
believed to violate the statute; it does not mandate such action.'37 It is
doubtful that Washington courts will agree that an ISP has engaged in
state action by voluntarily pursuing any of the three approaches to
developing reasonable belief.
Government action may occur when the government has authorized
the conduct at issue and private actors have voluntarily acted, as long as
courts can fairly characterize the actor as a state actor.'38 Under the antispain law, however, the question about the appropriateness of the three
approaches arises because the State has not explicitly authorized any
methods for forming reasonable belief.'39 Because ISPs pursue active or
hybrid approaches without government authorization, the ISP activities
do not disturb the constitutional protection of privacy from government
intrusion. 4 '
If ISP content monitoring does not qualify as state action, such
monitoring probably will escape constitutional scrutiny altogether. The
Supreme Court of Washington has yet to decide whether the Washington
Constitution prohibits private action that intrudes on the right to

135. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. The anti-spare statute does not authorize ISPs to inspect e-mail messages but does authorize
ISPs to block violative e-mail messages. Because e-mail blocking is a state-authorized activity, ISPs
engaged in blocking might meet the description of a state actor. ISPs provide a service that is very
similar to a traditional governmental service by serving as an electronic post office. Moreover, the
incidents of government authority might uniquely aggravate the injury by virtue of the no-liability
protection for ISPs who act pursuant to the statute in good faith. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
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nondisclosure. 41 The court has decided that private action can violate the
speech and initiative clauses of the Washington Constitution'42 because
of the preferred status of the speech and initiative rights."' The right to
nondisclosure, on the other hand, is not considered a fundamental or
preferred right,'" so Washington courts are unlikely to find a
constitutional violation when an ISP engages in content monitoring that
amounts to only private action.14
Even if a court agrees that the ISP's act of examining an e-mail
somehow constitutes state action, that court still would need to decide
whether to apply strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis to the state
action. 6 Strict scrutiny applies to state actions infringing upon the rights
to personal autonomy and decisionmaking, because those rights are given
fundamental status under the Washington Constitution. 4 7 Washington
courts apply rational basis scrutiny to non-fundamental rights, such as
the right to nondisclosure of personal information. 1" Given the
judiciary's reluctance to extend the class of fundamental rights of
privacy, courts probably will favor an application of the rational basis
test to ISP examination of private e-mail messages. Moreover, the
subscriber's right to receive e-mail without disclosure of the contents
more closely resembles the right to nondisclosure of personal
information than the fundamental rights to freedom and autonomy in
decisionmaking. Because the privacy right in e-mail delivery does not
implicate a fundamental right, state action that intrudes on that right must
only satisfy the rational basis test 49
Therefore, the final question in this privacy analysis is whether there
is a neutral and legitimate government interest that suffices as a rational

141. See supra note 83.
142. See supra note 84.
143. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
145. The Supreme Court of Washington is more likely to interpret the constitutional privacy
protection to prohibit private action that infringes upon fundamental rights, such as the right to
autonomous decisionmaking, because of the importance of those rights. See O'Hartigan v.
Department of Personnel, 118 Wash. 2d 111, 117-18, 821 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1991) (refusing to
classify nondisclosure of personal information as fundamental privacy right).
146. See supranote 71 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 74-75, and accompanying text.
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basis to authorize the conduct. 5 ° Provided that the government can
demonstrate a rational basis for intruding on the particular privacy right,
the state action is permissible even when less intrusive methods exist to
151
obtain similar information.
The legislative findings of the anti-spam law indicate that the
legislature intended to provide immediate relief to ISPs from the heavy
burden of carrying e-mail messages with false or misleading points of
origin. 52 The findings do not specifically indicate the rationale for
allowing ISPs to block messages with false or misleading information in
the subject line. 153 Nonetheless, such a policy furthers a legitimate
governmental interest by fostering confidence among e-mail subscribers
154
that commercial e-mails are accurate, reducing the burdens on ISPs,
and abating the burden on the Attorney General's office in responding to
consumer complaints about commercial e-mail. These governmental
interests provide sufficient and rational bases that permit the government
to intrude on the nondisclosure privacy right of e-mail subscribers.
Furthermore, because active content monitoring could be expected to
produce more effective enforcement of the anti-span law than reactionary
or hybrid approaches, a rational basis exists to support the use of proactive
methods, despite the existence of less intrusive approaches.
C.

Message Screening Does Not Violate the Washington PrivacyAct

Although the Washington Privacy Act has been labeled one of the
most restrictive privacy acts in the nation,'55 the protection is illusory to
e-mail subscribers seeking protection from unwarranted intrusions by
their ISPs. The Act's protection of sealed messages does not apply to
most e-mail messages because they are not sufficiently "sealed." The
various exceptions to the Act's prohibitions render the Act completely
ineffective against the contemplated ISP activities. Thus, the high wall of

150. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
153. The legislative findings state that "the consumer protection division of the attorney general's
office reports an increasing number of consumer complaints about commercial electronic mail."
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.005 (1998). However, nothing in the statute itself ties these consumer
complaints to the provisions allowing ISPs to block messages with false or misleading information
in the subject line.
154. See supra notes 9-t1 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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privacy created by the Washington Privacy Act is nevertheless one that
an ISP can easily surmount and does not protect users from ISPs that
choose to engage in active content monitoring.
1.

The Act's Sealed Messages ProvisionDoes Not ProtectMost
E7mail Messages Because They Are Not "Sealed"

The Washington Privacy Act prohibits unauthorized parties from
opening or reading sealed messages.1 6 When construing the provisions

of the Privacy Act, the Supreme Court of Washington has interpreted
undefined statutory language in its ordinary and usual meaning.5 7 E-mail
undoubtedly falls under the general rubric of "messages" as that word is
5
commonly used. 1

Although e-mail communications qualify as "messages," it is not as
clear whether e-mail messages are "sealed." Most e-mail users send their
messages in unencrypted form, 159 exposing their messages to the view of
others while they travel through cyberspace. In this respect, e-mail

resembles an unsealed postcard more than a sealed letter."6 However,
even unencrypted e-mail messages are severed into packets before being

transmitted across the Internet. 6' Those packets often travel along
different routes toward their destination, where the packets are finally

reassembled into the complete e-mail message. 62 Given the difficulties
of locating these packets during transit and reassembling them into the

complete e-mail message, would-be interceptors can only feasibly
intercept e-mail messages at the sender's or the recipient's host

156. See supra note 92 and accompanying text
157. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
158. Courts commonly refer to e-mail communications as e-mail messages. See, e.g., JessupMorgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Andersen
Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Wesley College v. Pitts, 974
F. Supp. 375, 380 (D. Del. 1997); Bonamy v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. App. 403, 407, 960 P.2d
447,450 (1998).
159. Encryption is a process by which a computer encodes the text of e-mail messages into
unintelligible symbols to prevent intercepting parties from determining the content of the message.
By use of a translation "key," the receiving computer can decrypt the message for reading. For an
easy-to-read explanation of basic encryption technologies, see generally Heath, supranote 116.
160. Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for
Internet Communication, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1591, 1597 (1997).
161. Id
162. Id
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computers. 163 Because packets effectively conceal the content of the
message during transmission, a court could conclude that the message is
sealed during transmission. Once the packets arrive at the recipient's host
computers for reassembly, the message again becomes exposed to
viewing in its entirety and loses any protection that the packet-wise
transmission might have conferred upon it. Because a receiving ISP
examines a message upon receipt and only after the message is
reassembled, the sealed message provision of the Privacy Act would not
forestall ISPs from engaging in active content monitoring.
A less technical assessment of what constitutes effective sealing also
would permit ISPs to engage in active content monitoring of most
messages. One court observed, "Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail
generally is not 'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or viewed on
intermediate computers between the sender and recipient (unless the
message is encrypted)."'" Under such an analysis, only encrypted e-mail
messages meet the sealed message requirement and unencrypted mail
65
messages receive no protection.1
Although the Act may give privacy protection to the concealed
portions of encrypted messages, the Privacy Act provides no protection
to unencrypted messages once ISPs receive the messages for delivery.
ISP monitoring of unencrypted messages can range from the reactionary
approach to the proactive approach without running afoul of the sealed
messages provision of the Privacy Act.
2.

Message Screening Does Not Violate the Interception or Recording
Provisionsof the Act Because 1SPs Use No "ExternalDevice"

The Privacy Act also protects point-to-point e-mail communications.
Specifically, it prohibits the interception or recording of such
communications by the use of some device external to the
communication. 166 E-mail can constitute a "[p]rivate communication
transmitted by telephone.., or other device between two or more
163. Id.
164. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
165. Encryption also makes it impracticable for ISPs to engage in active monitoring because
modem encryption securely conceals the content of the e-mail message. Ironically, the encryption
process that can transform an e-mail into a "sealed" message is the same process that renders the email's "sealed" status unnecessary because ISPs would become unable to examine the message
content.
166. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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individuals."' 67 E-mail communication is generally a communication
between at least two people by use of computers. The Act protects only
"private" communication, as demonstrated from a fact-specific inquiry into
the intent and reasonable expectations of the parties.'6 8 Because of the fact
specificity of the inquiry, it is difficult to predict in any generalized sense
whether e-mail messages will meet the test. However, courts should find,
in the appropriate circumstances, that the parties to an e-mail message
reasonably expected the contents of the message to remain private. One
military tribunal has found that an e-mail subscriber had an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in messages sent to other e-mail users
with individually assigned passwords.'6 9 Such a message should meet the
privacy requirement of the Privacy Act. On the other hand, commercial email messages sent to thousands of e-mail accounts would probably not
satisfy the privacy requirement because the sender could not reasonably
believe that the message would remain private. 7
When an ISP blocks the transmission of an e-mail message, it effects
an interception under the Privacy Act. Despite this interception, the antispam law specifically relieves ISPs from liability for blocking messages
they reasonably believe violate the anti-sparn law. 7 ' Thus, as long as the
ISP formed a reasonable belief and acted in good faith upon that belief,
the more recently enacted provisions of the anti-spain statute render the
Privacy Act's provisions against interception inapplicable to an ISP's
decision to block e-mail messages72
Proactively monitoring the subject line and points of origin of e-mail
messages does not result in an interception or recording under the Privacy
Act because no interception or recording occurs without the use of some
device external to the communication. 73 When an ISP actively monitors
167. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1)(a) (1998).
168. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 575 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Maxwell does not decide whether it is also reasonable to
expect privacy in messages sent over the Internet, where messages are more susceptible to being
viewed and intercepted.
170. E-mail sent to numerous strangers seems roughly analogous to telephone conversations with
total strangers, which have been determined not to be private as a matter of law. Kadoranian v.
Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash. 2d 178, 190-91, 829 P.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1992).
171. See supra note 35.
172. The provision against recording or intercepting communications remains an important check
against bad faith actions that ISPs might take. For that reason, ISPs should be wary about abusing
their power under the statute.
173. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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subject line and origination information, it is using the same computer
system as the communication it is monitoring and, applying the same logic
as the extension telephone cases, t74 should not constitute an interception or
recording. Because these monitoring practices use no device external to the
e-mail communication, no interception or recording occurs.
V.

THE WASHINGTON ANTI-SPAM LAW SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO LIMIT ISP ACTIVITIES

Existing privacy protections fall miserably short of protecting e-mail
subscribers from intrusive ISP activities. Privacy law permits ISPs to
take even the most active steps of examining the body of e-mail
messages addressed to private subscribers if they so choose. Given the
permissiveness of current privacy protections, the Washington
Legislature should reassess and revise the anti-spam statute. The
revisions should include explicit provisions prohibiting ISPs from
actively monitoring the content of messages. Such a revision would
safeguard the privacy rights of e-mail consumers, while retaining
adequate protection for the legitimate property interests of ISPs.
A careful review of the legislative findings makes it clear that when
the legislature passed the anti-spam law, it was attempting to remedy the
problems of ISPs.'75 Admittedly, many e-mail subscribers may share the
concerns of their ISPs about the growing volume of commercial e-mail.
E-mail subscribers also benefit from the statute's provisions that enable
the recipients of violative e-mail messages to sue the sender.176 Whatever
protections the statute gives to users from abusive e-mail senders, the
statute makes no attempt to protect users from the activities of their own
ISPs. This lack of concern for user privacy from ISP monitoring is not
surprising, given that the legislature enacted the anti-spar statute to
protect the interests of ISPs.
The legislature easily could rectify the oversight by amending the antispar statute to include specific limitations on the permissible actions of
ISPs seeking to form a reasonable belief that a message violates the antispam law. Existing federal law permits the legislature to endorse the
reactionary, the hybrid, or the proactive approaches (or any combination of

174. See supranotes 10 1-02 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the three) when forming a reasonable belief.' The constitutional protection
of privacy rights also permits the legislature to sanction any of the three
approaches. 7 8 Although such an endorsement would constitute state
authorization of intrusions on the right to nondisclosure of e-mail messages,
the authorization would need to satisfy only a rational basis inquiry. 9
Specifically, the legislature should amend the anti-spam statute so that
it prohibits ISPs from examining the contents of e-mail messages and
limits ISPs to the reactionary approach to implementing the anti-sparn
statute. 8 ° As the law currently reads, ISPs can actively scan the content
of e-mail messages under the hybrid and proactive approaches and incur
no liability for doing so if they act in good faith on their reasonable
beliefs. Under this proposed amendment, ISPs could only develop a
reasonable belief by way of past subscriber complaints. 8' Furthermore, if
an ISP overreached its authority by engaging in active content
monitoring, the ISP would lose its shield from liability because it failed
to make good faith efforts to comply with the statute. These changes
would clarify the role of ISPs under the anti-spam law and prevent ISPs
from overexerting their authority.
Recall the Samantha and Roger hypothetical discussed in the beginning of this Comment. At present, neither Samantha nor Roger has a
valid claim against Roger's ISP, despite the ISP's use of active content
monitoring to form a reasonable belief that Samantha's e-mail violated
the anti-spam statute. The ISP properly sequenced its activities to avoid
the only non-excepted provision of the ECPA. The ISP is probably not a
state actor and, even if it is, the ISP could postulate a rational basis for its
activities. Finally, the ISP did not open or read a "sealed" message as
that term is defined under the Washington Privacy Act and did not use
any device external to the e-mail communication to intercept or record
Samantha's and Roger's communication.

177. ISPs qualify under exceptions to the disclosure and access provisions of the ECPA and can
sequence their activities to avoid the ECPA's prohibition of interception of electronic communications. See supraPart IV.A.1.
178. The right implicated by all three approaches is the privacy right against disclosure, so the
"rational basis" test applies. ISP active content monitoring surely meets that low standard. See supra
Part IV.B.
179. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
180. Although the Attorney General has not expressed a position as to the limitations on ISPs in
forming a reasonable belief, the passive approach is the only approach that the Attorney General has
affirmatively endorsed. See supranote 112.
181. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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Under the proposed amendment, however, Samantha and Roger would
have a valid cause of action. Roger's ISP did not believe that Samantha
was a known violator of the anti-spare law, as revealed by customer
complaints. Instead, Roger's ISP relied on the proactive approach of
active content monitoring. Because the proposed amendment to the antispam statute would unambiguously forbid such content monitoring,
Roger's ISP could not have acted in good faith reliance on the anti-spam
statute and would not qualify for protection from liability. Roger and
Samantha could both sue for damages incurred as a result of the
examination and the blocking. By amending the anti-spam law, the
legislature can protect the rights of individual e-mail subscribers like
Roger and Samantha more effectively while still allowing ISPs the right
to protect their property interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
ISPs should not be dragooned into service by free-riding
entrepreneurs. At the same time, e-mail subscribers should retain a
sphere of privacy in their e-mail communication. The legislature must
strike an appropriate balance between these competing interests. In part,
the Washington anti-spam statute attempts to address ISP and subscriber
concerns by creating civil penalties for those who send false or
misleading e-mail messages. The legislature also empowered ISPs with
the right to block messages reasonably believed to violate the statute.
This blocking provision, coupled with a complete statutory silence on the
issue of how an ISP is to determine when an e-mail violates the statute,
poses a substantial threat to the e-mail subscriber's privacy right. An
evaluation of existing state and federal privacy protections reveals that
even the most intrusive ISP activities of active monitoring are not
prohibited. Fortunately, the legislature can restore the privacy rights of email subscribers by passing an amendatory clarification of the limits on
ISP activities in determining whether a particular e-mail message
violates the anti-spam statute. The legislature should permit ISPs to
block messages based on prior complaints of their subscribers and should
prohibit ISPs from actively monitoring the content of incoming and
outgoing messages. Such a limitation will best effectuate the interests of
e-mail subscribers and ISPs alike.

